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Lost in translation

Goa’s unexplored potential to connect India and the Portuguese-speaking world must be tapped

On a hot Delhi afternoon in the late spring of 2008, I got a desperate call from Juvenal C, a journalist from the West African nation of Guinea-Bissau. Juvenal had come under a scholarship of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme (ITEC) to attend a three-month course at the Institute for Mass Communication Studies, in New Delhi. The only problem was... he didn’t speak a word of English.

This was no rare exception: Portuguese-speaking Mozambicans and Timorese are sent to study not only in Delhi, but also smaller North Indian cities like Ludhiana, under various Government of India programmes, sometimes for full BA or PhD courses. As most of them have very limited knowledge of English, they often leave disappointed and I’ve met many who promise they’ll never return to (or recommend) India. But they would feel completely different if sent to Goa: more than the natural beauties of the coastal state, they would enjoy the opportunity to speak in Portuguese and explore many cultural similarities with their home countries – from food and music to the love for football. Instead of a disgruntled Juvenal, Delhi would see a delighted Juvenal returning as India’s finest ambassador to Guinea Bissau.

To avoid more stories like this one, India must make more intelligent use of its immense cultural diversity in its public diplomacy. Goa and its relations with the Portuguese-speaking world are a stark example of this unexplored potential. As New Delhi diversifies its external relations and builds stronger links with Latin American and African countries, and considers offering courses in French to scholars from francophone Africa, it should also find space for a niche diplomacy targeting the Portuguese-speaking world.

There are 250 million native Portuguese speakers in the world. It’s the world’s fifth or seventh most spoken language (depending on the criteria you choose, but certainly more than French), and it is official in eight states across four continents, five of which are in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe) and one each in Europe (Portugal), South America (Brazil) and Asia (Timor Leste).

Each of these countries is of strategic interest to New Delhi’s objectives to access critical resources and increase its global influence, and four of them are of particular importance. Brazil, a fellow IBSA member, is crucial to establish a significant footprint in Latin America, and many Indian investments there are hindered by the country’s low level English proficiency, a 2011 study placing it 31st among 43 economies. Angola is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, source of 5 percent of India’s oil imports, and many of its diamonds end up in Gujarat. Mozambique is a rare success story of India’s Africa policy, with several investments in the mining sector and of increasing importance to Delhi’s naval interests in the Indian Ocean. And Timor-Leste, the geopolitical hyphen connecting the trendy “Indo-Pacific” region, is witnessing massive Chinese and Australian investments in its infrastructure and offshore gas reserves, but has no formal Indian diplomatic representation.

India is thus affected by a Lusophone
(Portuguese-speaking) paradox that sees many of its efforts lost in translation: while its economic engagement with these countries and Macau is booming (now at $15.3 billion, up by 400 percent since 2005), the diplomatic and cultural engagement is lagging far behind. This will go on as long as there are only a handful of Indian diplomats fluent in Portuguese (and posted in Italy or Thailand) and the immense potential of Goa continues to be ignored.

If Punjab is used as a hub for confidence building measures towards Pakistan, Tamil Nadu as a bridge to Sri Lanka, and the Northeast as a “Look East” platform, why not transform Goa into India’s hub for the Portuguese-speaking countries? The region was under Portuguese control until 1961, has thousands of fluent Portuguese-speakers, and centuries of close links and exchanges with Brazil, Angola and the six other Portuguese-speaking countries (parts of the former Portuguese empire, including Mozambique, Macau and Timor, were actually administered from Goa itself until the late 19th century).

China, which integrated the former Portuguese colony of Macau in 1999, is already using the region (where Portuguese is an official language) as a hub for its Lusophone diplomacy, most notably through the Macau Forum, set up in 2003, which serves as a biannual ministerial meeting between Beijing and all eight Portuguese-speaking states. There is no reason why Goa should not host such an official (or, to start with, and informal Track-2) dialogue. This is an idea supported by many decision-makers in Brazil and Africa, including former Mozambican minister Oscar Monteiro, who recently called for Goa to play a “driving role” in India’s re-engagement with his country.

Most importantly, India must, in the meantime, secure its status as an associate observer of the CPLP, the organisation of Portuguese-speaking states (similar to the Commonwealth and the Francophonie). Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Senegal have all succeeded in acquiring such a status, and even China and Indonesia have expressed their interest. Brazil and Portugal should sponsor India’s entry, and Angola, currently holding the Presidency, would certainly be supportive.

At the same time, Goa would also be the perfect location for a naval security dialogue between the Indian Navy and its eight Portuguese-speaking counterparts, which could include peacekeeping efforts, anti-piracy and coastal security. India has been involved in joint exercises with the Portuguese Navy, the Brazilian one (under IBSAMAR with South Africa) and has reached an agreement with Maputo to patrol the strategic Mozambique Channel.

**Parts of the former Portuguese empire, including Mozambique, Macau and Timor, were administered from Goa until the late 19th century**

There are also softer dimensions of potential cooperation that deserve to be explored, including sports. For example, the Indian Olympic Association agreed in 2006 to become a member of the Association of Portuguese-Speaking Olympic Associations. New Delhi has since then agreed to send an Indian delegation to the first two editions of the “Lusophone Games” (Macau and Lisbon), and also backed Goa’s successful bid to host the third edition in 2013 (defeating Brazil). More such possibilities should be explored.

In an embarrassing mistake last year, India’s external minister S. M. Krishna read out the Portuguese minister’s speech at the UN Security Council, including a “personal note” expressing his “profound satisfaction regarding the happy coincidence of having two members of the Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Brazil and Portugal, together here today.” If India finally decides to make good use of Goa and upgrade its relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries, perhaps in future Indian speeches these same words will no longer express mistaken, but genuine satisfaction.
Calcutta, it bears repetition, was once the second city of the British Empire. In formal terms, its decline began in 1912, when the Raj moved its capital to Delhi. Exactly, a hundred years later, the West has symbolically snapped its last link with the city, with Lufthansa, the only remaining western carrier to service it, announcing the discontinuation of its Calcutta-Frankfurt flight. In 1959, Calcutta became the first Indian destination for Lufthansa, ahead of Delhi and Bombay. In 2006, the German carrier re-asserted its faith in the city by starting a Calcutta-Frankfurt non-stop flight, declaring that the city had been identified as a “high growth area with immense potential.” The potential appears to have been belied. Lufthansa has now said, Goodbye, Calcutta—until market conditions improve.

The announcement has come as a huge embarrassment to the new state government of the Trinamool Congress, whose representative, Saugata Roy, is also Minister of State for Urban Development at the Centre. He was all set to inaugurate, later this year, the state-of-the-art new terminals at the airport, which will increase passenger handling capacity many times. All he could say now was “It is an ominous sign... I really have no answer to the question on what do we do with an airport with much better facilities but not enough passengers.”

Ominous sign indeed. Once the business and industrial capital of the country, Calcutta, “filthy, gorgeous”, as the New York Times describes it, continues to suffer from chronic decline. In 1985, a neophyte Prime Minister raised a furore by describing Calcutta as a “dying city.” That appellation has stuck and is often recalled by commentators even three decades later.

Calcutta’s obituary has been written many
times since 1912: In 1947, when Independence for India meant the vivisection of Bengal and the loss of Calcutta’s jute growing hinterland to Pakistan; in 1956, when the introduction of the infamous Freight Equalisation Policy caused the loss of comparative advantage for the Ruhr of India; in the 1970s, when widespread labour unrest, spawned by left militancy, caused deindustrialisation and capital flight; and in the ‘80s and ‘90s, when the Left Front Government in Bengal focused on rural regeneration through land reforms and panchayati raj, turning a blind eye to Calcutta’s woes and causing an exodus over a period of 20 years of middle-class talent (leading the novelist Amit Chaudhuri to write, “It seems that every Bengali bourgeois’ destiny is to be a pravasi”). But somehow, the city has soldiered on. In Ghalib’s classic phrase, Maut aati hai, par nahi aati. Reports of Calcutta’s death, like those of Mark Twain’s demise, have been greatly exaggerated. The dying city refuses to die. In fact, in the last decade or so, there have been green shoots of revival—the upshot of the Left Front’s efforts to right the wrongs of the past. It focused attention on the long-neglected city. Calcutta saw the mushrooming of high-end housing projects, five-star hotels, glitzy shopping malls and flyovers. Perceptions about the city began to change. One Delhi-based columnist, who described himself as “an economic refugee” from Calcutta, wrote: “Dead city walking? It’s a lot more than that. There’s a business-like buzz about the City of Joy.” But the buzz has not been enough. While the change has been encouraging in many areas, and impressive in some, the overall picture remains dismal and bleak. The city needs help and urgently and while the new Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee promises to “turn Calcutta into London”, the task is so stupendous and the need so pressing that it seems beyond the state government’s ability to deliver. Calcutta’s death or resurgence, Lazarus-like, is not a cause for concern only to its denizens. It is a matter of national importance because the destiny of “India’s original economic powerhouse”, as The Economist describes it in a recent issue, is linked inextricably with the fate of its hinterland, which happens to be the entire Eastern India. Its primacy in its hinterland is unmatched by that of any other Indian metro: By one estimate, the population of Calcutta is ten times that of Patna, the second biggest city of Eastern India. Calcutta has continued to play the role of the pre-eminent commercial hub for all of Eastern India. The Calcutta Port, the oldest in the country and the only riverine one, services a vast region of over a dozen states, extending from Eastern Uttar Pradesh (Mayawati’s Purvanchal) to the deepest Northeast, as well as landlocked Nepal and Bhutan.

This strategic importance of Calcutta is only going to increase with increased subregional cooperation in India’s northeastern neighbourhood. The Kunming Initiative, or the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Forum, is a robust Track-II effort for economic and cultural cooperation between these four countries that are geographically contiguous and economically complementary. Kunming is the capital of the Yunnan province of China and the initiative is named after it because it all began with a conference for regional cooperation held in that city in 1999. The broad goals of the Kunming Initiative are substantially improved regional connectivity for goods and people in the region, through a network of roads, railways and waterways, and establishing the Kunming-Mandalay-Dhaka-Calcutta economic corridor. The Kunming Initiative is a shining example of Track-II driving Track-I.

The best part of the Kunming Initiative is that it is not an effort to create something that has never been attempted before. Trade ties and overland connectivity in the area had existed since millennia. The fabled Southern Silk Road existed over 2,000 years ago. More recently, the legendary Stilwell Road (named after General Stilwell of the United States Army) was built during World War II to connect Ledo, Assam with Kunming, 1736 kms away, to ferry supplies as part of the Allied war effort. The exigencies of the war also led to the building of a Sino-Indian oil pipeline from Calcutta to Kunming and the use of the famous Hump flight route by innumerable
Allied military aircraft to transport supplies from India to Southwestern China over the eastern Himalayas.

Since 2008, Kunming and Calcutta have been reconnected by air and the flights (taking one hour 51 minutes to cover 1487 kms) are always full. Business, tourism and educational ties between Bengal and Yunnan have been growing steadily, thanks to the efforts of another Track-II initiative, called the Kolkata to Kunming (K2K) Forum.

However, China appears to have made more progress than India in developing economic ties with both Myanmar and Bangladesh. India has had serious concerns about the growing Sino-Myanmar entente and, as a response, has ignored naysayers to reach out to the military regime in Yangon.

Lately, Sino-Bangladesh ties, too, have shown signs of being on the upswing. Disappointed by New Delhi’s tardiness even in delivering on its own promises, Dhaka is increasingly turning to China for economic assistance and linkages. Already, China, not India is the biggest investor in Bangladesh. The self-same China, it has been pointed out by an Indian analyst, that had opposed the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Most recently, China has agreed to build a deep sea port for Bangladesh and has responded positively to a request to establish direct connectivity between Bangladesh (Chittagong) and China (Kunming) through Myanmar.

New Delhi must rise to the occasion and ensure that India does not get left behind in this concerted push for sub-regional integration. The good news is that New Delhi’s ostpolitik or Look East policy has the support of the highest level of government. Not only that, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh realises the criticality of Calcutta as the gateway to the East (Southwest China and Southeast Asia).

Speaking at the Golden Jubilee celebrations of IIM, Calcutta in August last year, he said, “I sincerely believe that a new sun is rising on our East, and Kolkata can once again regain its glory as India’s window to Asia. One of the greatest Indians who re-discovered India’s Asian identity and Asia’s links with India was Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, the first Asian Nobel Laureate and a proud son of Bengal and India. His travels to the East helped India reconnect with its civilisational neighbourhood. The time has come to build on this great civilisational heritage and to pool all our wisdom, knowledge and experience to revitalize West Bengal’s economy, polity and society so as to scale new heights of human endeavour and achievement in the service of the people of West Bengal and India as a whole.”

In one succinct paragraph, Dr. Singh re-emphasised India’s links with its “civilisational neighbourhood”, spoke of the need to build on those links, recognised the role of Calcutta as the gateway to the East and stressed how the realisation of its potential would mean revitalisation of not just Bengal but “India as a whole”.

But here too, as with much else in Dr. Singh’s intent, policy-making and policy-implementation, in Eliot’s verse, “Between the idea / And the reality / Between the motion / And the act / Falls the shadow.”

He has, for instance, reached out to clasp Sheikh Hasina’s extended hand of friendship, but has been unable to deliver very much beyond that. Last September, he became the first Indian Prime Minister in 12 years to visit Dhaka. It was to be a historic visit. Much was achieved, but there was no agreement on the two most important and contentious issues: river waters and overland transit. The deal on Teesta waters was torpedoed by Dr. Singh’s UPA ally Mamata Banerjee. Since Dhaka tends to link a deal on river waters with transit rights, India will have to continue to wait for an overland link to the Northeast through Bangladesh.

Trans-border connectivity and turning Bangladesh into a regional transit hub can transform the economies of both Bangladesh and Eastern India. For instance, trans-Bangladesh connectivity will mean that the distance between Calcutta and Guwahati will go down from the current 1300 km to 587 km and the distance between Agartala and Calcutta will go down from 2000 km to 350 km. Once again, transit through East Bengal would not be a novel development. Even after
Partition, until 1965, there was free movement of goods and people across international borders through the then East Pakistan.

If it is agreed that Calcutta must realise its destiny as India’s gateway to the East and the engine and principal driver of economic regeneration in the entire eastern India, it must regain its lost glory as an economic powerhouse. Revival of manufacturing industry in its immediate neighbourhood is a must. The ill-fated Nano project in Singur could have acted as a catalyst, but that was not to be. The new government in West Bengal must identify, facilitate and fast-track several such projects if manufacturing has to be revived in Bengal.

But manufacturing industries have relatively long gestation. Knowledge industries can be put up quickly if their modest requirements of land are met. In this area, the previous Left Front Government had done remarkably good work, which is not adequately acknowledged. Calcutta was the city which housed India’s first computer. Way back in 1956, the Indian Statistical Institute, founded by planning guru PC Mahalanobis, had received a computer called Ural from the USSR. Yet, when computerisation took off in other parts of the country in the 1970s and 80s, the Bengal communists refused to countenance it. Therefore, fostering an IT industry in Calcutta was not on the Left Front’s agenda in the first few terms of its long 34 year rule.

It was only in the mid-Nineties that the Left Front Government took to promoting the IT industry. When it did, it did with a vengeance and provided all support to those who dared to invest in Bengal. The communists went to the extent of declaring IT an essential service to keep the 24/7 operations of the IT companies out of the purview of the all-too-frequent bandhs in the city. Soon, the IT industry gathered its own momentum and Calcutta turned into one of the leading IT hubs in the country, acquiring many firsts — the most cost-effective, the fastest growing and the one with the lowest attrition rate.

The new state government must go further than build on this solid base created by its predecessor. It should capitalise on the professional talent generated by the state (much of which now migrates to the other metros) and develop Calcutta as a centre of excellence for IT and other knowledge-based industries. This will not only keep the talent home but also draw back such professionals as had migrated to other states in the earlier decades. Over time, this hub will need additional talent, which can only come if Calcutta and its environs are developed as a centre for higher education in the knowledge sector.

**Left Front turned a blind eye to Calcutta’s woes and caused an exodus of middle-class talent**

There is more that Calcutta urgently needs. The city had the first Metro in the country, but that has remained a one-line wonder. It needs a network of lines the way Delhi has. The new airport will soon be ready, but work must be expedited in the proposed deep sea port, off south Bengal. The riverfront is being developed—in part and in isolation. However, as a recent IIM-Calcutta study has recommended, the river, lovely and yet neglected and abused, needs to be integrated with the city—in terms of the citizens’ mindscape and in terms of connectivity and physical landscape. Ms Banerjee may not ever succeed in turning Calcutta into London, but if these changes are effected with the support of the Centre, she will have succeeded in transforming the city into a global megapolis—to use the famous Nehruvian phrase—“not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially”.

Roughly one decade ago, there was a strong debate in India about how we should tackle the problem of education. There were two views. On one side were intensifiers who felt that nothing was fundamentally wrong; all that was needed was more money. They argued that we should just continue building more government schools and hiring more civil servants to act as school teachers, and we’ll be fine. On the other side were the reformers, who argued that the basic incentives in Indian education were wrong. And putting more money down a dysfunctional system was pointless.

The Intensifiers won this debate. An informal coalition of educationists (i.e. the incumbent education system) and leftists came together, supported by the World Bank, which pushed for mere enlargement of Indian education, without questioning the foundations.

All of us are involved in this story at many levels. At the simplest, we are the customers of the education establishment. We pay income tax and VAT and a few other taxes. On top of this, we pay the 2 percent education cess. In return for this, we get certain educational services. These influence our kids, and they influence all the young people that we encounter in this young country. Trillions of rupees have been spent, and more than a decade has gone by. It is time to assess the performance of this strategy.

Three blocks of evidence are now visible, which tell us that the Intensifiers were wrong. The old strategy, which was invigorated by a vast rise in spending, was the wrong one.

The first evidence is the OECD PISA results for India. The OECD PISA is an internationally comparable measurement system which
reports on the reading, mathematics and science knowledge of 15 year olds. It reports on the end product of the educational process: How much do children actually know? The first OECD PISA measurement was done recently, albeit with coverage of only two states—Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh.

The results are gloomier than could have been imagined. It tells us that Indian education policy has failed miserably: India is ranked at either 78th or 79th in the world, out of 79 countries measured, on all three elements (reading, science, mathematics). This measurement covers both public and private schools. It covers both urban and rural children. It should be a source of real concern for all parents who worry about how their children will cope with globalisation. At age 15, kids in India are among the worst in the world.

The second evidence comes from ASER 2011 results. Pratham has been running surveys which measure characteristics of children and schools in rural India. Their latest survey results, for 2011 finds that kids learn better in private schools. As an example, surveyors ask kids in class III to recognise numbers up to 100. In private schools, 20 percent of the children are unable to do this. In public schools, 40 percent of the children are unable to do this. Roughly speaking, the failure rate in public schools is twice as high as the failure rate in private schools.

Over the years, the gap between public and private schools has been going up. Prima facie, this points to a difference in the quality of schooling. In addition, a selectivity process may be in motion: if parents have started recognising that there is a difference, they may be selectively sending brighter children to private schools.

The process of rural children shifting from public schools to private schools is going on at a slow pace. At class II, the fraction of rural children in private school went up from 19 percent (2007) to 23 percent (2011). At class VII, this rose more slowly to levels slightly above 20 percent.

The final evidence comes from CMIE household survey. CMIE has data for the year ended March 2011 about the behaviour of 169,492 households. This yields information about expenses on books, journals, stationary, additional professional education, education overseas, hobby classes and other education expenses. They also report expenditure on school/college fees and tuition fees. The evidence on fees mixes payments for elementary and higher education. However, enrolment in higher education is quite small; the bulk of what is seen is likely to be related to elementary education.

The overall average expenses show up as 2.1 percent of household expenditure on school/college fees and 0.57 percent of household expenditure on private tuition. Significant expenses, of roughly 1 percent of household expenditure, are seen with the poor also.

If parents chose to stay within public sector schools, their expenditure on fees would have been zero. However, across all income groups of India, there is movement towards private provision of education, both by paying fees at schools and by paying for private tuition classes. These two elements add up to 2.67 percent of overall expenses of households.

These decisions of well intentioned parents are the strongest indictment of education policy in India. The product being given out by the Intensifiers is such a terrible one, the parents of India are walking away from it even though it is free when the alternative is not and the parents are poor.

For more than a decade, the Intensifiers have controlled Indian education policy. They have said: “Leave education to the education establishment, do nothing radical, just give us more money, we will deliver results.” Now we know that they were wrong. They took the money, but failed to deliver the results.

Kapil Sibal has said that his ministry should not be held responsible for the stream of bad news that is coming out. This is dodging accountability. His ministry is responsible for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan, for the Right To Education Act and for blocking OECD PISA from being done in India. The bureaucratic consensus of his ministry represents the
education establishment.
The key phrase that needs to be emphasised today is accountability. If a contractor took money from you, and failed to deliver on building your house, you would sack him. (You would also take him to court, to recover the money that was paid to him, for services not delivered). In similar fashion, education is too important to be left to the educationists.

We need to start over. We need to start over in the field of education, with a fresh management team, one that is not a part of the status quo, one that is rooted in the worlds of incentives, public policy and public administration.

The flow of public money into status quoist education policy needs to go down sharply

In 2004, we were told that in return for a tax rate increase of 2 percent, in the form of an education cess, we would obtain improvements in education. We now know that those improvements did not come about. Hence, that tax rate increase should go. It is another matter that even if sharp improvements in educational outcomes had been obtained, the education cess was a mistake in terms of basic public finance, and needed to go. Public expenditures on education should simply come out of general tax revenues; there is no need to have a cess.

The flow of public money into the status quo needs to go down sharply. There is no reason to put money into something that fails to deliver the goods. First we must prove that a mechanism delivers results, and only after that should we put money into it.

OECD PISA measurement needs to take place every year at every district. The production of this data is a public good that the government can and should do. It can be fully contracted out to private firms so as to avoid the problems of public sector production. Data Sets about student characteristics and school characteristics should be released, covering every district and every year, so as to enable research.

Civil servant teachers, who have tenured (permanent) have no incentive to teach well, regardless of their qualifications or high income. While it is not possible to sack them, fresh recruitment needs to stop. The existing stock can be reallocated to other civil service functions where staff is in short supply. Through this, it would become possible to whittle away at the accumulated stock over the coming 20 years.

These are starting steps of what needs to be a fresh approach to education in India.
January 13, 2012 was a special day, marking the first year in which no new cases of polio were reported from India. For once, the headlines in media, in India and internationally, seemed devoid of hyperbole. It is a signal achievement because India was for decades one of the biggest centres of the disease. Along with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, India was classified as an endemic polio nation. Collectively, these four countries were referred to as PAIN in health circles.

A decade ago, in 2002, the world was shocked at the violent resurgence of polio in India. Success seemed similarly in sight and the Indian health establishment reduced the number of planned immunisations. Then, laxity in the field resulted in at least 15 percent of homes not being visited. With these, India and more specifically, the state of Uttar Pradesh found itself as the global epicentre of polio. New cases of polio rose six times over 2001, with India accounting for 83 percent of the cases reported worldwide. Worryingly, the Uttar Pradesh strain of the wild polio virus started travelling to other countries, resulting in resurgence in countries which had been declared to be polio free. In 2002, UNICEF made Uttar Pradesh its number one priority for stopping transmission of the polio virus around the world.

This history teaches us to be cautious and not let our guard down. The polio virus is extremely wily. Unlike smallpox, the only other global scourge eradicated decades ago by another global task force, one cannot visually identify a person infected with polio immediately. A child infected with polio can keep on shedding the virus in excreta, with the risk of infecting another 200-250 children before detection.

Polio strikes the poorest children, living in unsanitary conditions, with naturally low
levels of immunity and poor nutrition. In India, UP and Bihar have been the hardest hit. The virus favours little boys over little girls—in UP it is poor Muslim boys, in Bihar it is the poor Hindu boys. This religious profile, if you will, has been targeted by mischief makers, who spread all sorts of rumours about how the polio vaccine is a nefarious plot to render the next generation sterile.

There are four reasons for the success of the current polio campaign. One, the global support for polio eradication was maintained at a high level, despite funding gaps initially estimated at $750 million. The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation pledged support to the cause of polio, providing much needed attention and a renewed vigour globally.

Two, the much improved bivalent oral polio vaccine was formulated, targeting both types of wild polio virus. With a 30 percent greater efficacy, it maximises the impact with hard to reach children.

In 2001, India accounted for 83 percent of polio cases reported worldwide

Three, intensive and targeted communication made the message of polio eradication one of the most recognised and recalled campaigns. Celebrities like Amitabh Bachchan, Shah Rukh Khan and Sachin Tendulkar urged parents to bring their children in for vaccination. Subtle changes were made in the campaign messaging.

I was a part of the communication team which discovered that high decibel advertising didn’t quite explain why the polio vaccine needed to be administered every time. The fact that polio vaccine needed multiple doses was at variance to what Mr Bachchan was saying – which was do boond, bas (two drops, that’s all). That caused enormous doubt and added fuel to rumours of inefficacy. The amended message, delivered through on-ground activation rather than via television, was do boond, har bar (two drops, every time). It went some distance in convincing parents that their children needed multiple doses of vaccines.

Finally, massive on-ground mobilisation of workers—by voluntary agencies, ministries of health, religious leaders and local influencers as well as the Rotary Club, a key sponsor of the Global Polio Eradication Effort.

These workers were up against a huge challenge. A destitute Muslim women health worker at CMC in Moradabad Urban, Zone II, with Worldvision recounted how families in the locality treated her: “They abuse. They throw filth from the balconies. Some of these well-to-do families drive us away as if we have come to beg for alms. But we have to go back.”

Even educated families had misgivings about the vaccination. An educated Muslim mother violently argued with our team: “It doesn’t work, is that why it has to be given again and again? I have heard that it is supposed to render our children impotent & infertile. I am not going to let my children be vaccinated. Go away, go away!”

Our team of volunteers would persist: “Like all girls in school, you must have got lice in your hair. Your mother must have gone crazy trying to get rid of the lice in your hair! Even if one girl in school had lice in her hair, wouldn’t all your mother’s effort to rid you of them come to nothing. Polio is like that, even one child has it, he could infect every other child.”

But that destitute health worker in Moradabad captured the spirit driving these workers: “Polio is a scourge. It can be prevented. It is just human folly if it cannot be eradicated now.”

When it finally arrives in January 2014, the victory over polio shall belong to these motivated people. India has set an example for others to emulate. “The evidence from India is if you do the job well, you stop polio,” David Salisbury, chair of the WHO’s European Certification Commission for Polio Eradication and Britain’s director of immunisation said. “And if it can be done in India, technically it can be done anywhere.”
Pakistan: Arrival and Departure

When it comes to Pakistan, everything is important and everything is uncertain

Three problems need to be discussed as a prelude to examining the factors that will shape Pakistan’s future. The first is the rhetoric of hope and failure, the second is sequencing, and the third is the difficulty of “sizing” the problem of Pakistan’s future.

Those who make predictions about Pakistan generally fall into two categories: the pessimists, who believe that things will go from bad to worse, and the optimists, who believe that history is about to reverse itself. The Pakistani American scholar Ahmed Faruqui is cautiously optimistic, noting that both France and Britain were mired in “cognitive dissonance” but eventually attained greatness. The consultants involved in the National Intelligence Council study on Pakistan’s future were deeply skeptical about Pakistan. Many Indian commentators and some liberal Pakistanis and the Islamic conservatives believe that Pakistan is doomed by its very nature—its cultural DNA—and that transformation must occur or collapse is inevitable. For some, there is a little Schadenfreude in their expectations of failure.

On the other hand, most contemporary writers hold out hope; they are cautiously optimistic, although the outright optimists are vanishing quickly. They see Pakistan’s known and important assets as evidence of at least the potential for positive transformation. In the words of a distinguished retired Pakistani diplomat, Tariq Fatemi, “Pakistan should be confident of its own abilities and optimistic
about its future given its size, location and the qualities of its people....So should the rest of the work, given that Pakistanis have been successful wherever they have gone, and in whatever endeavors they have undertaken.”

Hope is neither a policy nor a planning factor, but it is intimately related to success and failure. The hope that things will or can be better is deeply embedded in the human condition, but it also is the mirror image of worst case thinking, the anticipation of catastrophe. Without hope, there would be little change, in a world dominated by fatalists and pessimists. On the other hand, excessive hope and blind optimism can be the basis for extremist and utopian movements.

If Pakistan’s capabilities are inadequate, it may be because its ambitions are too great

Sequencing is yet another important conceptual issue, because it forces one to prioritize. As an Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses study noted, all of the factors or variables shaping Pakistan’s future are important. But are any factors more important than the rest? Can we distinguish between those that are important but intractable and those that might be amenable to change? The fundamental question is whether some or all of the variables that will shape Pakistan’s future must operate in a certain way to enable something resembling success to occur, but that question is also fundamentally hard to answer. It is evident that there are many factors that qualify as critical to Pakistan’s future; none, however, are determinative in their own right. Internal social and economic decay is one factor, but so is the incoherence of the Pakistani political establishment; the political establishment’s relations with the military, especially the army; and the role of friendly and hostile outside powers. At least six conditions are necessary for a stable Pakistan, but none are sufficient, and their sequencing and timing are critical.

My view is that modesty with regard to what can be done is the most appropriate stance because these are events that are inherently difficult to understand. To adapt the words of a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, “I don’t know where Pakistan is heading, but once it gets there I will explain to you why it was inevitable.”

Finally, there is a “sizing” issue. Scientists talk about sizing a problem—stating its parameters—as the first step toward solving it. In discussing the challenges and capabilities of Pakistan at the Bellagio workshop, Sir Hilary Synnott examined the metaphor of the glass that is alternatively described as being half-full or half-empty, noting that perhaps the real problem is that glass is too large. That is another way of “sizing”: if Pakistan’s capabilities are inadequate, it may be because its ambitions are too great. This suggests that priorities are critically important and that Pakistan has to decide which of its challenges are urgent and which are secondary and can be deferred. State capacity then can be directed to the most important problems.

One aspect of this “too-large glass” is that Pakistan carries with it the enormous burden of the past. When it comes to its relations with its most important neighbor, India, and its most important international ally, the United States, its overarching narrative is that of victimhood. Pakistan’s perception of itself as the victim of Hindu domination has led to the mother of all “trust deficits,” a deficit that can never be eliminated because it stems from deeply held believe that Indians are dominating, insincere and untrustworthy. In this view, there is nothing that Pakistan can do to normalize the relationship because Indians/Hindus are essentially untrustworthy and have proven that to be true time and time again. My view is that if trust is a component of the problem, it is eternal one. There can never be “enough” trust between sovereign states, but sovereign states might think of both trusting and verifying, which in Urdu can be translated as aitemaad aur tasdeeq.

With regard to US actions, many Pakistanis
believe that Afghan war in the 1980s, the Pressler sanctions, and other harmful or duplicitous policies were instances of the United States using Pakistan and abandoning it. The war destabilized Pakistan, and the sanctions were imposed because of a nuclear program that Washington had earlier chosen to ignore. More recent examples include the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to attack the Taliban (which itself had not done the United States any harm), pushing radical elements into Pakistan and further destabilizing the country. The U.S. narrative of all of these events is, of course, quite different, and there is a deep trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States, as well as Pakistan and India. With regard to both sets of relationships, any policy that assumes trust is likely to fail.

When it comes to Pakistan, everything is important and everything is uncertain. To frame the discussion of the factors or variables that are most important in shaping Pakistan, nineteen of them are grouped into four clusters. The first cluster includes domestic concerns with respect to demographics, urbanization, the economy, and education; these are all closely related, and with the exception of the economy, which is subject to changes in policy, they are less mutable than others. A second cluster concerns the collective identity of Pakistan’s people, who identify themselves and act on the basis of their regional, ethnic, and state affiliations. The third cluster concerns the ability of Pakistanis to work for or against a common goal or even to determine what their goals might be. Here are included the bureaucracy and structure of the government; the ability of its officials, notably the military; and the role of the increasingly important electronic and print media. The fourth and final cluster includes the policies and attitudes of important foreign states as well as the phenomenon of globalization. These are the factors that shape Pakistan’s environment. Globalization, of course, penetrates into Pakistan in many ways and affects the other factors, shaping economic possibilities, influencing the ambitions and they very identities of Pakistan’s citizens, and aiding or undercutting the workings of the state in different ways.

Excerpted from *The Future of Pakistan* by Stephen P Cohen
A liberal vision for India

India yearns for its liberals to unite behind a vision of great prosperity

In 2011, India made a distinct turn away from economic freedom with the failure of FDI in retail and the Cabinet nod for the so-called Food Security Bill—‘food’ for none, job ‘security’ for babus and a ‘bill’ for the rest of us. This turn towards statism will not be without terrible consequences. In spite of the two decades of progress brought about by a marginal increase in economic freedom, India has lost the plot. The question is why.

At least in part it is because economic freedom is not, and was not even in 1991, defended as a matter of principle. To defend opening up of the retail sector to foreign investors or doing away with import duties on used cars as singular measures is playing in socialist terrain, for those against liberty will point to specific gains from curtailing freedoms while promoters of freedom have only yet unknown gains to offer. There is an urgent need to change the very terrain of public policy debate in India, and we must begin by paying heed to the following passage from Nobel Prize winner, F A Hayek’s book The Constitution of Liberty: “...freedom is almost certain to be destroyed by piecemeal encroachments. For in each particular instance it will be possible to promise concrete and tangible advantages as a result of curtailment of freedom, while the benefits sacrificed will in their nature always be unknown and uncertain. If freedom were not treated as the supreme principal, the fact that the promises which a free society has to offer can always be only chances and not certainties, only opportunities and not definite gifts to particular individuals, would inevitably prove a fatal weakness and lead to its slow erosion”.

And a defence of liberty as a principle ought to offer a vision for India—a vision with answers to three fundamental questions. One, how can India become rich? Two, what about
income-inequality? And three, what about the caste-system? We look at each in turn.

One, how can India become rich? Modern economic growth happens through widespread application of science to production processes. And this happens not by government intervention but by entrepreneurship. Simon Kuznets, who won the Nobel Prize in 1971, tells us that “many economically important inventions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the results of attempts to apply new scientific discoveries, attempts by people like Edison and Marconi who were no scientists but who understood the scientific advances and were impelled to look for practical applications”. The Soviet Union despite having had a very high number of PhDs per capita at one point did not produce a single innovation in consumer goods! This is because entrepreneurs bloom only in free market economies. Economists James D. Gwartney, Randall G. Holcombe, and Robert A. Lawson in a cross-country study of 99 countries for the period 1980-2000 find that “holding constant geographic factors and changes in human and physical capital, a one-unit increase in a country’s EFW [an index of economic freedom] rating increases the growth of per capita GDP by about 1.24 percentage points.” And 1.24 is not a small number; with the magic of compound interest a two unit increase in EFW could by itself double incomes in 29 years. In short, both theory and history tell us that the only – and yes only – way ordinary Indians can become wealthy is through a market economy.

Two, what about income distribution? The market process is a leveling process both on the production and consumption side. A characteristic feature of a laissez faire economy is the introduction of new products and news production methods. This means capital employed in old production methods continuously become obsolete, and the wealth of owners of that capital depreciates in value. New entrepreneurs rise to riches and old fall, Vilfredo Pareto called this the “circulation of elites”. The elite in capitalism (unlike in Feudalism or Communism) are like the occupants of a hotel, the hotel is always full but never of the same people! That is the story on the production side. As for the consumption side, suffice it to quote the great Joseph Schumpeter: “the capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for the queen but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls…” The vast majority of government redistribution plans appear pale in contrast to the capitalist redistributive process. And redistribution through profit-motive rewards success in serving others unlike redistribution through vote-motive which reflects success in stealing from others.

A market economy is the antidote to the age old caste system

Lastly, what about the caste system? Capitalism nailed feudalism in the Western Europe, and it promises to do far worse to the caste system in India. Kuznets tells us that “Amongst the concomitants of modern economic growth are...an increase in the nonpersonal forms of economic organization, and a rise in the relative important of economic achievement in the scale of social values”. Non-personal forms of economic organisation—no city dweller knows the caste of her milk producer—limits the domain of discrimination. And the growing influence of economic achievement flies in the face of by-birth social values. Interesting fairly modest increases in economic freedom seems to have brought above significant improvements for Dalits in India. In a 2011 paper, University of British Columbia scholars Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul find that wage gaps between Scheduled Castes (people from the bottom rung of the Hindu caste system) and non-Scheduled Castes have declined since the 1980s. This is no surprise, profit seeking firms link wages to worker productivity, not caste! Progress however is not merely an income-story. A recent survey of 19,087 Dalit families in two districts of Uttar Pradesh found that access to markets had improved Dalit grooming and eating practices, and increased
access to jobs traditionally considered to be non-Dalit. In short, a market economy is the antidote to the age old caste system. And unlike the government’s lets-enlighten-the-masses formulas which work well solely on Ministry of Education’s policy documents, markets revolutionise the minds of real people—bottom up.

A liberal vision for India is thus a vision of great prosperity, less inequality and an inequality which is more a reflection of individual choices and abilities rather than birth, and a system whose very logic is antithetical to the caste system. India yearns for its liberals to unite behind such a vision; 2010 tells us that halfhearted measures might just not be enough. The liberal must say to the collectivist, ‘this is my vision for India, what is yours?’
I thank the Subbu Forum and the IIC for doing me the honour of asking me to deliver the first memorial lecture in memory of the late K Subrahmanyam (KS), a towering figure, a teacher to many of us, and someone who was central to debates on India’s national security for over half a century.

This lecture is also a responsibility because of the very high standards of intellectual rigour and analysis that KS set in his lectures and writings. Many of you present here knew KS well. His intellectual sharpness was awe inspiring until you understood that it was an expression of his dedication to his craft and to the power of reason, and hid a sensitive appreciation of others beneath that forbidding exterior. Today every think tank in India which concerns itself with strategic affairs has people who worked with KS and whom he mentored. He combined those qualities of mind with personal courage, which became evident when he was on an Indian Airlines aircraft which was hijacked.

But I am not here to recount KS’ life or his intellectual struggles with orthodoxy and political correctness in matters of national security.

Instead I would like to consider what K Subrahmanyam stood for in his professional life and the areas where he enriched our strategic culture. Let us first look at Indian strategic culture itself. Thereafter we might look at how KS changed the way that we in
India look at some major security issues. And finally I will speculate on what would concern KS if he were looking at the world today.

India's Strategic Culture

We often hear statements alleging that India lacks a strategic culture. Sadly, this is more often heard from Indians than foreigners. One sometimes wonders whether the idea that India lacks a strategic culture was not useful in the past to those who did not wish to see India’s weight translate into the effective exercise of power on the international stage. While one can understand foreigners spreading this idea, it is incomprehensible to me that some Indians should also believe this and still propagate this idea.

The most cogent expression of this idea was by George Tanham, a senior defence analyst at Rand Corporation in the early nineties. Frankly speaking, for a civilisation and state like India not to have a strategic culture is impossible. It is like someone claiming to be apolitical, which itself is a political choice. Many others see in India a strategic culture that is “more distinct and coherent than that of most contemporary nation states”, according to Rodney W. Jones.

What is strategic culture and how can foreigners and Indians draw such diametrically opposite conclusions about India's strategic culture? As I have said before, the most comprehensive (but incomprehensible) definition I have seen is that: strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions and modes of behaviour, derived from common experience and accepted narratives (both oral and written) that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. Or, to put it more intelligibly without the academic jargon, strategic culture is an identifiable set of basic assumptions about the nature of international and military issues. This would involve both a central strategic paradigm (about the role of war in human affairs, the efficacy of force, the nature of the adversary, and so on), and a grand strategy or secondary assumptions about operational policy that flow from the assumptions.

By this definition of course we in India have a strategic culture. It is an indigenous construct over millennia, modified considerably by our experience in the last two centuries. For instance, war and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war, the culture treats it as acceptable when good fights evil. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. Both major Indian epics deal with wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. Kautilya addressed the use of force in detail. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted appropriate violence as unavoidable in certain circumstances. As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct whether legal or on human rights, so long as they respect India's status. The traditional culture also has a strong pedagogical bias which is reflected in the way India chooses to negotiate, and in the attendant risk that any external compromise is seen domestically as surrender.

One of the best descriptions of India's contemporary strategic culture is by Kanti Bajpai who pointed out differences between ‘Nehruvians’, neo-liberals and hyper-realists, stressed what is common to all three streams of Indian strategic thought, and described how they might differ on the best means but not on India’s external goals. To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ on the best strategy and means to be adopted.

For 'Nehruvians', the natural state of anarchy can be mitigated by understandings between states, and to make preparations for war and a balance of power central to security and foreign policy is both ruinous and futile. For neo-liberals, mutual gain is a conditioning
factor for the natural state of anarchy between states, particularly as they become interdependent. They therefore see economic power as a vital goal for states, to be achieved by free markets at home and free trade abroad. The hyper-realists are however pessimistic and do not believe in transformation, only endless cycles of inter-state threat, counter-threat, rivalry and conflict, where the risk of war is only managed by the threat and use of violence. For them the surest way to peace and stability is the accumulation of military power and the willingness to use force.

For Bajpai, relations with the USA provide an example of how this works in practice. All three streams recognise the USA as the only superpower and of real significance to India, and agree that it is no military threat to India but that it is a diplomatic threat at times with US policies affecting India collaterally, particularly in the region. Nehruvians see the USA as an imperial power that must be contained and cannot countenance any rivals, and they therefore seek multilateral answers to the preponderance of US power. On the other hand neo-liberals take the opposite view, stressing how essential the USA is for India's own development, and believing that the US can be supportive of India's views and aspirations. Hyper-realists differ from both, arguing that the only way to build India into a military power of the first rank is to work with all those who might help, like the USA, but to realise the limits of that cooperation and its limited utility for India's security.

The elements of Indian strategic culture are evident in what is common to all three streams, Nehruvians, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. The same elements are also evident in earlier Indian writings on statecraft, whether in Kautilya, the Mahabharata's Bhishmaparva, or even in Ashoka's edicts. All regard the international system as anarchic, and see international relations as fundamentally power relations. In the practical application of that culture therefore, all three of today's Indian schools believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India's security in a world that shows no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination, and which is inhabited by threats to India's security.

It is this common strategic culture that we inherited, first clearly expressed and adapted for modern times by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which explains the substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our foreign policy, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power. Our goals have stayed constant even as the means available to us have increased and as the world around us has become more complex and more linked to our own development.

For instance, our actions in 1971 should have been no surprise to anyone who had bothered to study our strategic culture. Both our major epics, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, are about wars and treat them as natural and normal, not celebrating them but as necessary instruments of statecraft, justified when good fights evil. This says something about war and peace as themes in our strategic culture.

We are sometimes asked how the non-violent land of Gandhi could do what we did in 1971. As Gandhiji himself said in “The Gita and Satyagraha”:

“I do believe that when there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. Thus when my eldest son asked what he should have done, had he been present when I was almost fatally assaulted in 1908, whether he should have run away and seen me killed or whether he should have used his physical force which he could have wanted to use, and defend me, I told him that it was his duty to defend me even by using violence…… I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her dishonour.”

In saying so Gandhiji was expressing ideas and a political rationalism whose roots one can trace back to India's ancient history, to Kautilya or Ashoka, whichever you prefer.

KS' Contributions

It would be clear from this brief description of
Indian strategic culture that KS stood squarely in a long tradition of thought and attitudes, but applied it creatively to the vastly changed circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century and the last decade. That his ideas faced resistance because they were new was natural. But so was their ultimate acceptance as orthodoxy, since they implicitly were a development of a long tradition of Indian strategic thought.

Let me try to list some of the more significant contributions that he made to Indian strategic thinking and culture. Five aspects in particular struck me as significant and relevant today.

One, the “Bomb-mama” and our Nuclear Doctrine. When KS began speaking of the need for India to build a nuclear weapon as the most cost effective solution to our unique situation, his was a lonely voice in India. It took years of steady and unrelenting argument and persuasion, (and, quite frankly, the actions of the NWS) for his ideas to be widely accepted. He persuaded us of the idea of nuclear weapons as political rather than war-fighting weapons. And when we did conduct nuclear weapon tests in 1998, it was natural that it was to KS as Chairperson of the NSAB that we turned to articulate the doctrine that governs the use and control of India’s nuclear weapons. (Pakistan, who tested soon thereafter, has yet to articulate its doctrine, which says something about the different strategic cultures at play in the sub-continent.)

It is easy to underestimate the significance of what KS did to teach us how to think about nuclear weapons in a democracy. The ideas that Indian nuclear weapons would only be used in retaliation, that they would remain firmly under civilian control, that deterrence required massive retaliation and therefore assured survivability creating a second strike capability, were all first articulated by KS. Today we take them for granted.

He also maintained the link with our traditional emphasis on disarmament, making it clear that it was because our security was threatened and the other NWS had not responded to our calls for general and complete nuclear disarmament that we were compelled to weaponise, and that we remained willing to disarm under legally binding commitments and timeframes accepted by all the NWS along with matching commitments from the NNWS.

We also owe to KS the very vocabulary that we now use in discussing India’s nuclear weapons programme. When KS began writing in public on the subject, the vocabulary of nuclear weapons policy was that created and developed in the context of the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. Its relevance to the Indian, or for that matter the Chinese, situation has always been limited. (In 2006, Chinese and US arms control experts realised after decades of talks that they needed a mutually agreed bilingual glossary to minimise misunderstanding. It took eighteen months to reach agreement on 1,000 terms relating to nuclear security. But there was still no consensus on key concepts like “limited deterrence” and “minimal deterrence” or “deterrence” itself!!) In our case, we are still in the process of developing our own vocabulary and concepts, building on the work of the pioneers.

Two, the debate over defence and development. When KS first began to write on defence issues in the sixties, the conventional wisdom was that every rupee spent on defence was a rupee snatched from development or feeding our people. The ‘guns vs. butter’ argument was natural in a country where government and individuals were poor and hunger was rampant. KS was one of the few after Sardar Patel to argue that economic development needed a sound defence as a prerequisite. He also went on to argue that the economic spin-offs from defence
spending were not inconsiderable in terms of growth and technological independence. He had a vision which was rare for that time of what defence as a sector could mean to the national economy, driving technological modernisation and growth by providing non-inflationary consumption. That we have not yet realised that vision in practice, despite exponential growth in resources available for defence, is not because his ideas were faulty but because they were never implemented. This debate on defence and development is one that still continues and is unsettled to this day.

Three, national security structures—The Kargil Review Committee and the GOM. If India was the first parliamentary democracy to attempt to harness the advantages of a National Security Council system, and has constructed structures for this purpose in the last ten years, many of the initial conceptions and ideas can be traced back to KS’ writings and those of his generation. A lifetime worth of thought was compressed into the Kargil Review Committee’s report and many of those recommendations were later adopted by the GOM.

Four, strategic autonomy in thought and deed. The one thread that ran through all of KS’ writings was the need to increase India’s real strategic autonomy. By this he never meant cutting ourselves off from the world. He realised that this would doom us to eternal technological mediocrity and leave us vulnerable to even minor threats. Instead he envisaged India working with other countries as equal partners, as an active participant in the shaping of international outcomes and, ultimately, the international system itself. For him non-alignment was a strategy, not an ideology. As a flexible realist he responded to changes in the international situation facing India: In the sixties he advocated India reaching out to the US; post-1971 he was a strong advocate of the Indo-Soviet relationship; after 1991, and particularly after 2005, he was impatient with our tardiness in grasping the strategic opportunities that he thought had opened up for India.

This was not mere opportunism. He was a strong nationalist, rejecting US conditionalities for military assistance after 1962; driving hard bargains with the USSR as Secretary Defence Production in 1979; and, resisting policy choices that would have constrained our nuclear options in the seventies.

Five, values in national security strategy—Realism-plus. What made KS’ realism different from the common or garden variety of Western realism was his ability to combine a strong commitment to the basic values of the Indian Republic (of secularism, democracy and pluralism) with his realist pursuit of national interest. I suppose one could call this the “realist-plus” approach. He was an advocate of value based relationships: with the US and others on democracy, with Russia on secularism, and with Europe on liberalism. He often argued that there was no real contradiction between the promotion of democracy and the pursuit of India’s interests in our neighbourhood. I remember heated discussions in the JIC when KS was chair in 1977-78. The example used by both sides of the argument was Pakistan, where democratic governments had been well-meaning but ineffective while military regimes had promised delivery but presided over a basically unsatisfactory relationship with India. It is an argument that still resonates in India today. But there was no question where KS stood on this defining issue.

KS argued that the values in the Indian Constitution—secularism, pluralism, democracy and quasi-federalism—were imperative to hold India together in the 20th century. India is alone, along with the USA in an earlier age, in seeking to industrialise and accumulate power as a democracy. All the other major nations of the world industrialised and gathered power before they became democratic. KS felt that this was why the rise of India, like the 19th century rise of the USS, would not arouse the concerns, conflicts and reactions that the rise of other powers throughout history have provoked. For him it was and remains a matter of India’s self interest to help to build a democratic, pluralistic and secular world order.
To my mind, perhaps the greatest contribution that KS made to intellectual discourse in India was to bring us back to the Indian realist tradition, one of the few realist traditions in the world that has a place of pride for values. KS’ writings and work re-taught us how to think strategically. He taught us that strategy is not just about outdoing an adversary who is trying to do the same to you. It is also about finding cooperative solutions and creating outcomes in non-zero-sum situations, (which are most of our lives), even when others are motivated by self-interest and not benevolence. Strategy is the art of creating outcomes that further your national interest and values, and includes putting yourself in others’ shoes so as to predict and influence what they do.

The measure of his success is the extent to which these ideas are now commonly accepted and no longer strike us as extreme. Not very long ago, in the living memory of my generation, this was not so.

KS’ Concerns Today

What would have concerned KS today? Shortly before he died, KS sent me four papers that he was working on. One was unfinished and the others were unpolished. The papers were nothing if not ambitious and magisterial, as one would expect from him. They were on an Indian Grand Strategy for the first half of the 21st Century, Indian Defence Policy, Nuclear Deterrent in the Indian Context, and India in the 21st Century. I do hope the KS Forum and the Subrahmanyam family will see their way to publishing these papers.

Reading these papers today, when uncertainty in the international system is at unprecedented levels and as we seem to be entering a new phase of the world economy, one is struck by how his “realist-plus” perspective seems best suited to describe what we see around us, and to chart a course forward. We are in a world where there are few certainties, where coalitions form around issues and alliances are permeable, where power is increasingly shared but unevenly among several major powers, and where conflicts are asymmetric. This is a world with which the Indian state system was familiar for most of our pre-modern history, a world where Krishna, Bhishma and Kautilya would all feel equally at home. So it seems logical that we should return to our strategic culture as made modern by thinkers like KS to seek answers to the questions we face.

If India is to deal with the issues of the new twenty-first century world, it is essential that we further elaborate our own culture and tradition of strategic thought. So long as India’s situation and needs are unique, we must encourage our own ways of looking at developments, and develop our own strategic culture, vocabulary and doctrine. To do so would be appropriate tribute to KS. Fortunately for us, there is no isolationist streak in our strategic thought so far, and we have a rich tradition to draw on. Ironically, the greater our capabilities, the more we need the world and are integrated into it. So, if anything, the need for and the rewards of studying our strategic culture will grow with time.

Delivered as Subbu Forum Memorial Lecture at New Delhi on 19 January 2012
The question of division of powers and responsibilities between the centre and the states has cropped up in several new legislative proposals. This issue was raised in Parliament recently during the debate on the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill and the constitutional amendment which was negatived.

The Constitution provides a scheme for demarcation of powers through three ‘lists’ in the seventh schedule. The union list details the subjects on which Parliament may make laws; the state list details those under the purview of state legislatures; and the concurrent list has subjects in which both Parliament and state legislatures have jurisdiction. The Constitution also provides primacy to Parliament on concurrent list items: if there is a conflict, a central law will override a state law.

In this context, three broad issues have arisen recently with respect to laws considered by Parliament. First, some laws have large financial implications for state budgets. Second, some laws leave little flexibility for states to tune the laws according to their needs. Third, some Bills may directly infringe upon the rights of states.

Parliament has enacted laws on subjects in the concurrent list which require states to allocate funds for implementation. States are required to comply with these laws but may not have the resources to do so. Indeed, their legislatures may have different priorities for allocating resources. Does such a law, then, conflict with the principle that state legislatures have freedom to determine their spending priorities?

For example, the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act was passed by Parliament in 2009. The implementation of this Act would require large capital as well as revenue outlays. The Act has a provision for sharing of costs between the centre and the states; however, that still leaves states with the responsibility to provide large budgetary allocations. As the Act confers a right to every child and makes it obligatory for the state government to fulfill this right, the annual budget of each state government must include the required funds. This implies that state legislatures do not have the freedom to vote against such an allocation. In effect, the expenditure is treated as a ‘charged item’ even though it is voted upon.

The second issue is with respect to the balance between uniformity and flexibility across states when a law is made on issues in the concurrent list. For example, the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill has been introduced in Parliament. As land acquisition is a concurrent list subject, states may also make laws on this topic as long as those laws do not contradict the central enactment. This leaves open the question of the level of detail to be included in the central law. A higher degree of detail ensures uniformity across the country and provides the same level of protection and rights to land owners and displaced persons. However, it reduces the flexibility for states to tailor the law for their local (and possibly very different) conditions. For example, the Bill lists 25 facilities that need to be provided in any area being developed for rehabilitation and resettlement. If people in some states prefer a higher level of an item being guaranteed and
are willing to take a lower level of another item in return, such a compromise would not be possible under the current Bill.

The National Food Security Bill also raises these two issues. It requires states to implement a number of initiatives, and to provide for the funds for the purpose. Indeed, the Bill does not even estimate the expenditure that would be incurred by the states. It also prescribes a uniform system for implementation across states. This is a deviation from the current system under which the centre allocates grain to states who, in turn, devise their own schemes.

The third issue relates to central laws on subjects that are in the domain of state legislatures. Indeed, this issue was discussed in the debate on the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Bill which had provisions relating to state government officials. Two justifications were made for the inclusion of these provisions: first that the law was on criminal justice which is a concurrent list item, and second that India’s obligations under the UN Convention Against Corruption meant that Parliament had jurisdiction to enact such a law. This issue could arise with respect to two Bills that were introduced in the winter session. The Citizens’ Grievance Redressal Bill and the Electronic Services Delivery Bill require state government departments to publish and implement citizen charters and to provide services through electronic means respectively. Given that such services fall under the responsibilities of states, it is not clear how Parliament has the jurisdiction to make these laws.

An interesting case was that of a constitutional amendment (passed in the winter session) that added a chapter on cooperative societies. Cooperatives are listed in state list so Parliament cannot make laws to regulate them. It can make a law if the Constitution is amended to shift this item from the state list to the concurrent list (or the union list). However, shifting of items across lists needs to be approved by half of all state legislatures. The method chosen was to add a chapter to the Constitution; it is not clear whether this amendment would stand up to the charge that it effectively negates the distribution of topics across the three lists. This had also resulted in a particular type of arrangement between private parties (cooperatives) being detailed in the Constitution. Other arrangements such as companies and partnerships are regulated by ordinary laws.

The proposal to amend the Constitution to enable a common goods and services tax presents a different type of challenge. The amendment attempts to provide both Parliament and state legislatures with the power to levy tax but Parliament’s law will not override the state law. Each state will effectively have veto power over the common rate of tax across all items in all states. The Bill also creates a dispute settlement mechanism and provides for appeals to the Supreme Court. Again, the possibility is open that a state legislature may disagree with the rate, and a decision by the Supreme Court overriding its objection could impinge on the state’s power of taxation.

These examples highlight the need for a detailed public debate on federalism and treatment of items in the concurrent list. When the Constitution was framed, the argument for centralising decision making was partly based on the need to hold the country together in the formative years. Given the size and diversity of the country, it may be time to revisit the subject to find a new balance between uniformity and flexibility.
HOW DODD FRANK ACT IS CONNECTED TO INCREASING CONFLICTS IN AFRICA/CONGO?

LAURA SEAY of Morehouse College enlightens you about this interesting aspect of Dodd Frank Act (DFA) in this really interesting paper (What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy - Working Paper 284). DFA has a section called 1502 which aims to increase transparency in financial reporting of all companies engaging in conflict regions of Africa. The law hopes that over a period of time lead to better governance in these countries. The law in particular is directed at Congo which contains rich mineral resources like are oil, gold, diamonds etc.

However Laura says instead of improving conditions in Congo, it has worsened them. Even before Act has become final law, exports from Congo are getting banned and almost 2 million Congolese mine workers have become jobless. Congolese President Joseph Kabila instituted a ban on all mining as a chance to persuade voters that he was engaging in constructive activities to improve the security situation in the east. Even American companies are finding it tough to monitor their relations immediately.

She says section 1502 should be implemented in phases with clear annual benchmarks over three years and Provide immediate assistance to affected mining communities. She says locals should be used to track financial trails and Focus on security sector reform as a distinct issue.

IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY OF EUROPEAN CRISIS

Robert Mundell gave us the first impossible trinity related to international economics. Dani Rodrik recently gave us another version in the international political economy arena. JEAN PISANI-FERRY gives yet another trinity (The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity) related to European crisis. This one is related to absence of co-responsibility for public debt, the strict no-monetary financing rule and bank-sovereign interdependence.

- Resolution of debt crisis has fallen on national policymakers. There is no fiscal union which can transfer funds to the needy state.
- The wide debt has hurt the banks which hold the debt.
- ECB’s reluctance worsens the crisis.

His main idea is lack of fiscal union is not the only reason for European crisis. The other two issues of a central bank not really responsible for financial stability and interconnectedness of government debt and banks is as problematic.

Though all the three are difficult to resolve and take time, crisis needs some action. Limited fiscal union looks more doable with an attempt to launch Eurobonds on an experimental basis. One should also read a recent paper by C. Randall Henning and Martin Kessler who looks at how fiscal union in US was shaped historically. It was a result of many years of work in progress with certain events shaping certain aspects of the union. The working history of Euro zone is just about 13 years old and is being forced to make changes which took many years in other economies. Euro has
clearly has been an experiment ignorant of economic history and wanting to achieve things a bit too quickly.

A PRIMER ON AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS

PETER BOTTEKE’s superb interview serves as a primer on Austrian economics school. Austrian school started out of Vienna in the late 19th century and over a period coalesced around New York University, which became a hub of teaching Austrian economics.

Where other schools are interested in the outcome, in Austrian processes are as important. In a supply and demand curve, a standard economist would focus on the price and quantity vector that would clear the market. The Austrians want to talk about all the exchanges and activity that take place that results in that vector being discovered and the market being cleared.

He covers key contributions of Mises and Hayek and how boom-bust cycle framework of Austrian economics is the reason behind most crises. In the end, it provides a superb mathematical perspective on Austrian Economics: Most standard economics assumes that the relationships we are trying to understand can be captured by a continuous function that’s smooth and twice differentiable. What the Austrian analytics suggests is that life is not actually a continuous and smooth function that’s twice differentiable. But instead a lumpy function, a discrete function, in which there are all kinds of difficulties in the ability for us to model them.

IN HIGHER END COLLEGES? A CASE STUDY FROM IIT-DELHI

VERONICA FRISANCHO ROBLES and KALA KRISHNA look at one of the most contentious issues of Indian polity. They assess the impact of reservation policy India’s one of the most prestigious educational institutes: IIT-Delhi. The study is based on a survey filled by graduating class of 2008 which includes around 450 students.

The major finding is reservations do not really work.

• Targeting: The research shows quota has more poor students than rich ones. Hence targeting is effective.

• Catching up: This is the most important objective. However, authors find via various ways that catching up does not happen. In some cases, they might actually be getting worse as general category does even better and widening the divide between them.

• Mismatch: They show students in quotas end up choosing higher-end engineering fields and end up non-performing. So there is a mismatch. They even end up getting lower salaries than the other quota students who choose lower end fields. The minority students who take up selective engineering course are unhappier and remain depressed compared to others as their performance is not upto the mark.

Apart from the debatable findings, what is notable is the vast coverage of the paper. The only problem is its limited sample size.
George Frost Kennan, the father of America’s Containment policy, was the rarest of men, a prophet with honour in his own country. Kennan ultimately reached such a venerable age, that he not only outlived the Soviet Union, whose downfall he foretold, but his own celebrated vindication. By the time George Kennan died in 2005 at 101, America was enmeshed deeply in Iraq and the Cold War seemed to many Americans like ancient history and the public reaction to the death of the most important diplomat of the 20th century was markedly underwhelming. Today, seven years later, pundits pine almost weekly for Mr X, or any worthy imitator, who can offer America a grand strategy with the clarity and power of a George Kennan.

Into the breach strides eminent diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis, offering a magisterial 784 page biography, a quarter-century in the making, George F. Kennan: An American Life. Gaddis, a noted historian of the Cold War and critic of revisionist interpretations of American foreign policy, has produced his magnum opus, distilling not only the essence of Kennan’s career, but the origins of his grand strategic worldview that were part and parcel the self-critical and lonely isolation that made Kennan such an acute observer of foreign societies and a myopic student of his own.

Gaddis, who is a co-founder of the elite Grand Strategy Program at Yale University, had such a long intellectual association with his subject, having been appointed Kennan’s biographer in 1982, that one wonders on theories of strategy at times where George Kennan ends and John Lewis Gaddis begins. Giving Kennan the supreme compliment among strategists, that he possessed in the years of the Long Telegram and the Policy Planning Staff, Clausewitz’s Coup d’œil, Gaddis does not shy away from explaining Kennan’s human imperfections to the reader that made the diplomat a study in contradictions.

Brilliant, intensely sensitive and a workaholic of fragile health, the deeply read Kennan was a polyglot linguist who “spoke the Russian of Pushkin”, which favorably impressed even the coarse and vulgar Stalin, and could be prone to “prolixity” in word and speech. Not because Kennan had the urge of a William Bullitt to dominate a conversation or of a Dean Acheson to impress, but because “he was operating on another level”. Kennan, alone among a legendary constellation of statesmen and policy makers, came to be regarded in the crucial years of 1947 -1950 as irreplaceable by his State Department.
superiors, who advanced Kennan’s career and protected him despite his frequent bouts of ill-health and periodic attempts at resignation born out of frustration, intellectual loneliness and physical exhaustion.

Kennan’s dark side was considerable. Dogged by a tendency to deep melancholy and self-imposed isolation, Gaddis reveals Kennan as a talented parvenu from the Midwest, who having climbed into the upper-reaches of America’s Eastern elite by merit, first at Princeton and then at the State Department, was awkwardly ill at ease and brooding. Kennan’s defense mechanism was an enthusiastic embrace of a reactionary kind of elitism that was less political than it was a sour, misanthropic, pessimism about society coupled with a paternalistic skepticism about liberal democracy that, for a short time, advocated authoritarianism. Strangely, this seemingly gloomy intellectual and loner could also muster well-concealed reserves of charm in the company of ladies and by Kennan’s own admission, he retained a wandering eye even into his advanced years.

Gaddis not only handles Kennan’s foibles with honesty and tact, but weaves them into explanations of Kennan’s rich but difficult relationships with key figures in America’s Cold War Establishment such as William Bullitt, Charles Bohlen, George Marshall, Averell Harriman, Loy Henderson, Dean Acheson, James F. Byrnes, James Forrestal, Robert Oppenheimer, Paul Nitze, John F. Kennedy, Dean Rusk and others. Whether Kennan was a friend, mentor, deputy, rival or advisor these men all exhibited at one time or another, the sort of respectful tolerance and indulgence for Kennan’s eccentricities that one usually sees reserved for artists and musicians. If strategy is a creative endeavour, Gaddis demonstrates that Kennan suffered for his “art”.

Kennan’s virtues as a strategist and geopolitical analyst were tied, in part, to his flaws. It is hard to imagine George Kennan as a sunny optimist and State Department pragmatist penning the X article or persuading the Truman administration to change course with a cable from the embassy in Moscow. The long view and the humility about the limitations of power would not have been present in a cheerful soul. As Gaddis concluded:

“What Kennan opened up, on that bleak day in Moscow, was a way out: a path between appeasement that had failed to prevent World War II and the alternative of a third world war, the devastation of which would have been unimaginable. Might someone else have proposed the path, had Kennan not done so? Probably in due course, but it is hard to think of anyone else at the time who could have charted it with greater authority, with such eloquence, or within so grand a strategic framework.”

Let that judgment be George Frost Kennan’s requiem.
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